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I. INTRODUCTION
Perched in a duck blind on the bayou in southeastern Louisiana,
waiting in anticipation for the next opportunity to raise his shotgun
and take aim at incoming fowl, Justice Scalia could not have possibly
anticipated that in a few short months, this hunting trip would be the
target of an American media firestorm of scrutiny. Unless you are an
avid watcher of the Outdoor Living Network, a Supreme Court Jus-
tice's duck hunting trip is hardly riveting news worthy of the attention
of virtually every American media outlet. Unless, of course, Vice Pres-
ident Cheney is the Justice's special guest on this trip, and just a few
weeks prior, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear a
case in which the Vice President is a named party.
When the media caught wind of the facts surrounding this trip,
there was an immediate and nationwide call for the Justice to recuse
himself from the case, culminating in a motion for recusal filed by the
Sierra Club.1 Relying on the federal statutory recusal standard,
which requires any federal judge to recuse himself if his partiality can
reasonably be called into question, the Sierra Club cited several news
sources from across the country unanimously calling for the Justice's
recusal.2
Justice Scalia's response to the Sierra Club's motion for recusal
was unprecedented. Issuing a twenty-one page memorandum, Justice
Scalia dissected the Sierra Club's motion, pointing mainly to the bla-
tant factual and legal errors contained in the motion as support for his
conclusion that someone could not reasonably question his ability to
decide the case involving the Vice President impartially.3 Justice
Scalia bolstered his position further by citing a substantial number of
historical relationships between Supreme Court Justices and mem-
bers of the Executive and Legislative branches, arguing that his rela-
tionship with the Vice President was no different than similar
friendships in the past. Thus, there were no unusual circumstances
necessitating recusal.4
Justice Scalia's response, though a compelling and thorough dis-
missal of the arguments raised by the Sierra Club's motion for recusal,
1. Sierra Club Motion to Recuse at 2, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03-475), available at http://news.fin-
dlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny22304scrbrf.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
2. Id.
3. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 924
(2004) [hereinafter Scalia Memorandum] (Scalia, J.), available at http://news.fin-
dlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny3l8O4jsmem.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005)
(memorandum respecting recusal).
4. Id. at 916-18.
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fails to apply the proper statutory recusal standard with which federal
judges and Justices are expected to gauge the appropriateness of
recusal. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's partial reliance on the duty-to-
sit principle, abandoned by Congress when it amended the federal
recusal standard in the early 1970s, is a further indication that some-
thing is amiss with his application of federal recusal policy.5
Part II of this Note discusses a more detailed factual background
surrounding the Louisiana hunting trip at the center of the Justice
Scalia recusal controversy and the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
a few weeks earlier. Included in this discussion is a thorough analysis
of the federal statutory recusal standard that Justices must apply
when deciding recusal questions. Part III analyzes Justice Scalia's
memorandum in response to the motion for recusal, revealing both the
continued presence of the duty-to-sit principle in Supreme Court
recusal decision-makings, and the explicit misapplication of the fed-
eral recusal standard by Justice Scalia. Part IV illustrates the poten-
tial consequences of permitting the Supreme Court to continue to
disregard the clear legislative intent behind the federal judicial
recusal policy, and suggests two alternatives designed to address the
policy concerns voiced by the Court as justification for this continued
disregard of the federal statute.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RECUSAL ISSUE FACING
JUSTICE SCALIA
A. The Trip
On January 5, 2004, United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia accompanied Vice President Richard Cheney on a government-
owned jet to Louisiana to enjoy a few days of duck hunting on the
bayou. 6 Although Justice Scalia had been on this same trip for the
past five years, it was the previous year that he learned that his Loui-
siana friend and host was an admirer of Vice President Richard Che-
ney.7 Because Justice Scalia was "well acquainted"8 with the Vice
President "from their years serving together in the Ford administra-
tion,"9 and because Justice Scalia was specifically aware that the Vice
President was an avid duck-hunter, he extended an invitation to the
Vice President in the spring of 2003 to accompany him the subsequent
winter.' 0 Vice President Cheney accepted the invitation and even of-
fered space on his government plane for the trip, pending availability.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
6. Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 915.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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There was free space, and so Justice Scalia, accompanied by two other
guests, joined the Vice President on his plane for the journey to
Louisiana.11
Justice Scalia described the setting of the hunting trip as simply
not intimate.12 This description was based on the fact that there were
a total of thirteen hunters on this trip and several other staff members
present,13 all of whom ate together and slept in "rooms of two or three,
except for the Vice President, who had his own quarters."14 Justice
Scalia and Vice President Cheney never hunted together and were
generally never alone except "for instances so brief and unintentional,
... walking to and from a boat, perhaps, or going to or from dinner."'15
The Vice President hunted for two days and then departed while Jus-
tice Scalia stayed and hunted a few more days before returning to
Washington on a commercial airline from New Orleans.16
B. The Writ
On December 15, 2003, roughly three weeks prior to the duck-
hunting trip described above, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted the Vice President's petition for a writ of certiorari.1 7 In
2001, Judicial Watch, Inc. and the Sierra Club filed separate actions
against the National Energy Policy Development Group ("NEPDG")18
and individual group members including the board's chair, Vice Presi-
dent Cheney, alleging that the NEPDG failed to comply with the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"). 19 Specifically, Judicial
Watch, Inc. and the Sierra Club alleged that the Vice President ap-
11. Id. at 920-21. Justice Scalia also states that his family members were not given
a ride solely because of their relation to him. Rather, any person going on this
trip who happened to be departing from the Washington, D.C. area would have
been extended the same courtesy from the Vice President. Id. at 921 n.2.
12. Id. at 915.
13. The hunting trip's host, Mr. Carline, had three staff members present and the
Vice President was accompanied by an undisclosed number of staff and security
detail. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 540 U.S. 1088
(2003).
18. The NEPDG is a task force created by President George W. Bush charged with
"developing a national energy policy designed to help the private sector, and gov-
ernment at all levels, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally
sound production and distribution of energy for the future." In re Cheney, 334
F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Memorandum Establishing National
Energy Policy Development Group (Jan. 29, 2001)). The task force was to consist
of six cabinet secretaries, several other agency heads and assistants to the Presi-
dent, and any other officers of the federal government invited to participate by
the Vice President. Id.
19. Id.
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pointed non-federal employees to the group, thereby requiring that
group to make public all reports, records, or other documents used
pursuant to FACA.20 After consolidating the separate actions, the dis-
trict court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and subsequently
approved the plaintiffs' discovery plan.2 1 Although the government
generally complied with the discovery plan, a motion for a protective
order was filed for documents relating specifically to the Vice Presi-
dent.2 2 The court first denied the government's motion for protective
order and then denied a request by the defendants for the court to
certify an interlocutory appeal on this issue.2 3 The government subse-
quently filed an emergency motion for writ of mandamus in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
seeking an order vacating the lower court's discovery orders and that
the Vice President be dismissed as a defendant from the action. 24 The
court of appeals dismissed the defendants' interlocutory motion, but in
December, 2003, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on
this discovery issue, and the case was set for argument.2 5
C. The Problem
After learning from the media that Vice President Cheney, a
named party in an action before the Supreme Court, went with Justice
Scalia on a hunting trip shortly after the Court granted certiorari on
the action, the Sierra Club26 filed a motion for recusal with the Su-
preme Court, asking that Justice Scalia not participate in any pro-
ceedings concerning whether the Vice President should be compelled
to disclose specific documents. 27 The Sierra Club premised its motion
on the recusal standard for federal judges found at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),
arguing that the vast majority of America's newspapers, representing
the voice of America and reflecting the public's purported perception
of impartiality, have called for Justice Scalia's recusal from this case
and that "any objective observer would be compelled to conclude that
Justice Scalia's impartiality has been questioned." 28 The Sierra Club
20. Id. at 1099-1100.
21. Id. at 1100.
22. Id. The government argued the discovery plan violated separation of powers prin-
ciples. Id.
23. Id. at 1101.
24. Id.
25. See United States v. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (tracing
the legal path of case against the NEPDG to the Supreme Court).
26. Judicial Watch, Inc. did not join with the Sierra Club in making the recusal mo-
tion, publicly expressing their doubts that "the presently known facts about the
hunting trip satisfy the legal standards requiring recusal." Scalia Memorandum,
supra note 3, at 914.
27. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d. at 1240.
28. Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 923 (quoting Sierra Club Motion to Recuse,
supra note 1, at 3-4).
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further argued that "[tihese facts more than satisfy section 455(a),
which mandates recusal merely when a Justice's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."
2 9
D. The Federal Statute
Section 455 of title 28 of the United States Code is a collection of
standards for federal judges, magistrates, and Supreme Court Jus-
tices to use in gauging the appropriateness of their recusal from an
action before their respective courts. Section 455(a) specifically pro-
vides that a Justice "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3o
Congress adopted § 455(a) in its current form in 1974 with the ex-
pressed purpose of creating a uniform statutory and ethical standard
for recusal so that "federal judges would no longer be subject to dual
standards governing their qualifications to sit in a particular proceed-
ing."3 1 In 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted
the American Bar Association's new Code of Judicial Conduct, making
it applicable to all federal judges. 32 Canon 3(c)(1) of this newly
adopted code provides that "a judge should disqualify himself in a pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
3 3
In the amended (and current) version of § 455(a), Congress adopted
language virtually identical to that found in the judicial code. The
benefit of such a revision was to replace the old subjective standard
where a judge should recuse himself if "in his opinion" his impartiality
was at issue, with a new objective standard of reasonableness. 34 The
new standard was intended to "promote public confidence in the im-
29. Id. The Sierra Club specifically cited and attached as exhibits twenty of the
thirty largest newspapers in the country that called on Justice Scalia to recuse
himself. Id. They also noted that "not a single newspaper has argued against
recusal." Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
31. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 9 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6353
(Department of Justice Report on proposed amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455).
32. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 1-2, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352.
33. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 4, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6353. In
1990, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct was somewhat reorganized and the
recusal standard was moved from 3(c)(1) to 3(e)(1). However, "[t]he 1990 Code
Committee retained the general standard for disqualification that appeared in
Section 3(c)(1) of the 1972 Code." AMERICAN B it ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 184-85 (1st ed.
2004).
34. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-55.
The statute in its pre-1974 form read:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party
or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on
the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
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partiality of the judicial process by saying... if there is a reasonable
factual basis for doubting a judge's impartiality, he should disqualify
himself."3
5
Another important reason why Congress adopted the objective ver-
sion of § 455(a) was that it wanted to remove the duty-to-sit principle
from judicial consideration. 3 6 Under the duty-to-sit principle, a fed-
eral judge, when faced with a close question of whether recusal would
be appropriate, "was urged to resolve the matter in favor of a 'duty-to-
sit.'" 3 7 In an opinion written about two years prior to the congres-
sional amendment to § 455(a), then Associate Justice Rehnquist
clearly stated the duty-to-sit principle as it applies to the Supreme
Court:
[T]he policy in favor of the "equal duty" [duty-to-sit] concept is even stronger
in the case of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no
way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge may be substituted for
another in the district courts. There is no higher court of appeal which may
review an equally divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the law
for our jurisdiction.
38
By requiring that a judge "shall" disqualify himself whenever his "im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned," the amended § 455(a) "ef-
fectively removed the duty-to-sit concept" from the federal courts.3 9
Congress specifically noted that "witnesses at the hearings were
unanimously of the opinion that elimination of this 'duty-to-sit' would
enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system."40
Post-1974 case law indicates that federal courts are now resolving the
recusal question in close cases in favor of recusal.41
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988) (empha-
sis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970)).
35. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964)).
38. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
39. Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualifica-
tion of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 662, 673 (1985) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 93-1453, at 5, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355); see also 13A
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§3549 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that the 1974 amendment to § 455 "has ended the
duty-to-sit concept in federal courts").
40. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
"[P]ublic confidence in the judiciary was undermined by a doctrine that could be
read as suggesting that in close cases judges should err in favor of participation.
Rather, the judicial tiebreaker should tend in the other direction, compelling
recusal in the close cases to avoid any taint of bias .. . ." Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 606 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir.
2000) ("[I]f the question of whether § 455(a) requires disqualification is a close
one[,] the balance tips in favor of recusal."); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d
1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Where the question is close, the judge must recuse
himself."); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that
[Vol. 84:650
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the objective of the post-
1974 version of § 455(a) is
to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable
person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in
the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no ac-
tual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the
judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart
and incorruptible.
4 2
In a recent discussion regarding the proper administration of § 455(a),
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[t]his inquiry is an objective one,
made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of
all the surrounding facts and circumstances."43
When applying the federal recusal standard, it is important to note
that the judge whose impartiality is in question is the one who makes
the final determination regarding the appropriateness of recusal.4 4
Upon appeal, a federal judge's recusal decision is subject to review
under an abuse of discretion standard.45 However, a Supreme Court
Justice's recusal decision is not subject to review and the Justice is in
no way required to announce the reasons for his decision.46
E. Justice Scalia's Response to the Motion to Recuse
Not only did Justice Scalia deny the Sierra Club's motion for
recusal, he also took the extraordinary step of issuing a twenty-one
page memorandum explaining his reasoning for reaching such a con-
§ 455(a) "requires judges to resolve any doubts they may have in favor of
disqualification").
42. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988).
43. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000). In Microsoft Corp.,
the Supreme Court denied both Microsoft's direct appeal and their request for
writ of certiorari for the case. Included in this opinion is a statement by Chief
Justice Rehnquist explaining why he did not recuse himself from the vote on this
case even though his son is not only a partner at a law firm representing
Microsoft but is also an attorney specifically working on a separate Microsoft is-
sue. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that "a well-informed individual
would [not] conclude that an appearance of impropriety exists simply because my
son represents, in another case, a party that is also a party to litigation pending
in this Court." Id.
44. This is most clearly indicated in the statute itself where it provides that a justice
"shall disqualify himself." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
45. See Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1996).
46. Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conun-
drum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 659 (1996); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appear-
ances Matter? Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61
MD. L. REV. 606, 620 (2002) ("[T]he disqualification decisions of Supreme Court
Justices are not subject to review by other judges or courts."). This is not to say,
however, that a Justice does not consult the opinion of other Justices on occasion.
In Microsoft Corp., Chief Justice Rehnquist first noted that he had "consulted
with his colleagues," prior to reaching his final decision on the recusal question.
Microsoft Corp., 530 U.S. at 1301.
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clusion.47 As a preliminary matter, Justice Scalia established a legal
standard upon which he would rely for guidance in reaching his final
decision not to recuse himself. Citing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
recusal opinion from Microsoft Corp. v. United States,48 Justice Scalia
pronounced that a judge's impartiality should "reasonably be ques-
tioned"49 only when inquiries are "made in light of the facts as they
existed, and not as they were surmised or reported."5 0 To a large de-
gree, Justice Scalia relied on the public misperception of both the facts
surrounding the hunting trip and the law relating to judicial recusal
in this matter, as reported in America's media, in making his decision
to deny the motion for recusal.
Justice Scalia called the Sierra Club argument that the major
newspapers are the voice of the American public "staggering," in light
of the factual inaccuracies reported in the articles relied on by the Si-
erra Club.51 For example, he singled out articles from the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Boston Globe, and San Antonio Express-News because
each described a different duration for the hunting trip.52 In another
example, he cited several other articles which proclaimed, in alterna-
tive forms, that he and the Vice President spent a substantial amount
of time alone together.53 For each of the noted factual inaccuracies
found in the newspaper articles, Justice Scalia carefully contrasted
the facts of the hunting trip as they actually happened in order to
leave no doubt regarding the gross misstatements pervading the me-
dia on this topic. 5 4
47. Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 929. Justice Scalia's memorandum is de-
scribed as "extraordinary" because it represents only one of a handful of instances
where a Justice has issued a formal writing documenting his recusal rationale.
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored two other recusal opinions in Laird and
Microsoft Corp. See supra notes 38, 43 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's
memorandum is also unique because, at twenty-one pages, it is roughly twenty
pages longer than the other two recusal explanations.
48. 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
49. Although Justice Scalia does not specifically cite 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) as the statu-
tory premise for the reasonableness standard quoted here, he later cites that stat-
ute when quoting the identical language. See Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3,
at 916.
50. Id. at 914.
51. Id. at 923. For a complete list of the factual inaccuracies noted by Justice Scalia,
see id. at 923-24.
52. Id. at 923-24. According to these various articles, the duration of the hunting
trip was four days, nine days, and several days. Id.
53. Id. The descriptions of the time spent together are quite colorful and serious.
The articles declared the two "spent time alone in the rushes," and accused them
of being "huddled together in a Louisiana Marsh" where they had "plenty of time
... to talk privately." Id. (internal citations omitted). The most serious of such
descriptions came from the Buffalo News that concluded "there is simply no rea-
son to think these two did not discuss the pending case." Id.
54. See id.
658 [Vol. 84:650
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In addition to the factual exaggerations and misstatements of the
articles and editorials, Justice Scalia showed great concern regarding
the failure of the news media to correctly describe and apply the legal
issues implicated by his friendship with the Vice President. Although
he readily acknowledged their friendship,55 Justice Scalia refused to
accept the media implication that this friendship, in and of itself, is
sufficient to reasonably call into question his impartiality on the case
involving the Vice President.5 6 Recognizing that "friendship is a
ground for recusal... where the personal fortune or the personal free-
dom of the friends is at issue,"5 7 Justice Scalia proclaimed that a
friendship has "traditionally not been a ground for recusal where offi-
cial action is at issue, no matter how important the official action was
to the ambitions or the reputation of the Government officer."
58
Justice Scalia called a rule which would require Justices to recuse
themselves from official actions in which friends are involved as "ut-
terly disabling."5 9 He grounded his rejection of what he called a "no-
friends rule"60 in a long history of well-known friendships between
Justices and other federal officials who, at some point, had business
before the Supreme Court in their official capacity. Noting friend-
ships between President John Quincy Adams and Chief Justice John
Marshall, President Theodore Roosevelt and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and the several Justices who were friends with President
Harry S. Truman, Justice Scalia pointed out that an application of a
"no-friends rule" would have surely required these Justices to recuse
themselves from several important and historically profound cases in
which their "official" friends were directly involved.
6 1
Justice Scalia then turned to the case-at-hand and noted that in
their complaint, the Sierra Club specifically designated the Vice Presi-
dent as a party "in his official capacity,"62 both as the Vice President
and as the Chairman of the NEPDG.63 He also pointed out that Vice
President Cheney is represented in this action by the United States
Department of Justice and not by a personal attorney.64 Finally, Jus-
tice Scalia recognized the potential political ramifications for the Vice
President if the Court was to rule in favor of Judicial Watch, Inc. and
55. In his memorandum, Justice Scalia cites his familiarity and acquaintance with
the Vice President as a reason for initially extending the hunting trip invitation.
Id. at 914. In another discussion Justice Scalia explicitly says that he and the
Vice President are friends. Id. at 916.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 917.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 917-18.
63. Id. at 918.
64. Id.
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the Sierra Club, and then rebutted this concern in two ways. 6 5 First,
he equated the potential effect of this action on the Vice President's
integrity and reputation with that of any other official in "virtually all
official-action suits." 66 Justice Scalia then summarily rejected the no-
tion that a Justice should make a recusal decision based on the degree
of political damage the case may inflict, describing such a rule as
"quite wrong."6 7
Justice Scalia also expressed concern about the inaccuracies re-
ported in the nation's media regarding his flight to Louisiana with the
Vice President on Air Force Two. Justice Scalia specifically addressed
the contention that by accepting the free flight, Justice Scalia "ac-
cepted a sizeable gift from a party in a pending case."68 As a practical
matter, Justice Scalia found this argument without merit because of
the fact that he purchased a round trip ticket from New Orleans to
Washington, D.C. which was equivalent in cost to the ticket he would
have purchased if the Vice President never offered the space on Air
Force Two in the first place. 69 Thus the flight with the Vice President
saved no money and was accepted solely because of its convenience.
As a matter of legal concern, Justice Scalia pointed out that govern-
ment officials frequently accompany members of the Executive Branch
on government planes when space permits and that accepting this sort
of flight "is not the sort of gift thought likely to affect a judge's
impartiality."70
Reasserting that the question of recusal is to be determined from
the perspective of a reasonable observer informed of all the facts and
circumstances, Justice Scalia reiterated the factual and legal inaccu-
racies reported in the nation's newspapers and then rejected the mo-
tion for recusal, concluding that "[s]uch a blast of largely inaccurate
and uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal question."71
65. Id. at 919-20.
66. Id. at 920.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 920-21.
70. Id. at 921. Justice Scalia bases this statement on the fact that the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978, which generally requires Justices to disclosure travel ar-
rangements provided by others, specifically excludes from this requirement
transportation provided by the United States Government. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 109(5)(C) (2000); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT: FILING INSTRUCTIONS FOR JUDICIAL OF-
FICERS AND EMPLOYEES, 25 (Jan. 2003)).
71. Id. at 924. There is one other consideration raised by Justice Scalia in his memo-
randum that is omitted from the discussion above. After noting that the Sierra
Club was unable to find any relevant case law to bolster their recusal argument,
Justice Scalia delivered a lengthy discussion of several cases that he believed to
be quite similar to the case-at-hand. The first set of cases involved Justice White
and Robert Kennedy (as Attorney General) who were on a Colorado skiing trip
while at least two cases involving Robert Kennedy were pending before the Su-
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III. ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR RECUSAL IN CHENEY v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Given a cursory reading, Justice Scalia's memorandum rejecting
the Sierra Club's motion for recusal has the appearance of a sound
decision premised on simple application of recusal law to the facts sur-
rounding both his hunting trip and the Court's decision to hear the
Vice President's case. However, closer scrutiny of the memorandum
reveals Justice Scalia's clear application of the duty-to-sit concept in
reaching his decision, even though Congress expressed the intention
of eliminating that concept when it revised § 455(a). A simple compar-
ison of Justice Scalia's recusal rationale to other Court recusal (or
non-recusal) decisions demonstrates that it is the Court's policy to
continue to apply the duty-to-sit principle in lieu of the revised objec-
tive recusal standard. Furthermore, the virtual absence of language
referencing § 455(a) in his memorandum raises serious doubt whether
Justice Scalia even considered the statutory recusal standard in
reaching his final decision. Because "the Judiciary could not function
as a viable institution in a democracy if the public lost faith in the
impartiality and integrity of its judges,"7 2 the issues implicated by
Justice Scalia's recusal decision should serve as a glaring signal to
Congress that it must revisit the subject of judicial recusal and pro-
vide an alternative recusal standard for Supreme Court Justices.
A. The Prevalence of the Duty-to-Sit Concept in Supreme
Court Recusal Decisions
The legislative history of § 455(a) leaves no doubt that Congress,
by converting the standard for recusal from a subjective to an objec-
tive standard, explicitly intended to eliminate the duty-to-sit concept
from the federal judiciary with the expressed goal of enhancing the
public's confidence in the federal court system. 73 Case law from vari-
ous federal appellate jurisdictions demonstrates that judges are now
resolving close recusal questions in favor of recusal rather than in
favor of a duty-to-sit that was prevalent prior to the 1974 amendments
preme Court. Two weeks after the trip, Robert Kennedy argued a third case in
front of the Court. Id. at 924-25. The second example involved the friendship
between Justice Jackson and President Franklin Roosevelt. Noting that the Jus-
tice took recusal obligations "particularly seriously," Justice Jackson continued to
maintain a close personal friendship with the President "whose administration's
acts came before him regularly." Id. at 925-26. Justice Scalia found no problem
with these relationships and concluded that no one else at the time did either. Id.
at 926.
72. Bloom, supra note 39, at 663-64 (citations omitted).
73. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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to the statute.7 4 Notwithstanding the fact that § 455(a) is applicable
to all federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, Justice
Scalia's memorandum unmistakably cites a duty-to-sit as one factor
compelling him to deny the motion for recusal.75 Furthermore, it is
equally clear that Justice Scalia's citation to this duty is not isolated
as the Court itself has specifically mandated that a Supreme Court
Justice must resolve a close recusal question in favor of hearing the
case. 76
Rather than explicitly referencing the duty-to-sit concept, Justice
Scalia cited the unique dynamic of having nine irreplaceable Justices
at the Supreme Court level as the compelling factor for resolving close
recusal inquiries. Justice Scalia further noted that at the federal trial
and appellate court levels, a judge who recuses herself from a case is
replaced by another judge and the case proceeds normally. 77 At the
Supreme Court level, on the other hand, there is no replacement Jus-
tice, and so the Court would be forced to proceed with eight Justices,
thereby "raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find
itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the
case."7 8 To bolster the legitimacy of this concern, Justice Scalia cited
the official recusal statement issued by the Supreme Court in 1993
where the Court cautioned that "[elven one unnecessary recusal im-
pairs the function of the Court."79
Although no other Supreme Court Justice has cited directly to this
official recusal statement, in 2000 Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced con-
cerns similar to those voiced by Justice Scalia Responding to ques-
tions about his refusal to recuse himself from the underlying case
because his son was a lawyer at a law firm representing Microsoft,
Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that in the Supreme Court "there is
no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the Court deprived of
the participation of one of its nine Members, but the even number of
those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a lower court decision
by an equally divided court."80
The similarity between the reasoning of Justice Scalia and that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist is unmistakable as they voice virtually identi-
cal concerns about the repercussions of recusal of a Supreme Court
Justice. These statements are also remarkably similar to those made
in Laird v. Tatum,8 a 1972 opinion written by then Associate Justice
74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
76. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
77. See Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 915.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 916 (quoting U.S. SUPREME COURT, STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY (1993)).
80. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000). For further back-
ground information on this case, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Rehnquist in which he emphatically embraced the duty-to-sit concept.
Issued two years prior to Congress' elimination of the duty-to-sit con-
cept from recusal consideration, Justice Rehnquist's statement called
the policy favoring a duty-to-sit at the Supreme Court level "even
stronger" because of the irremediable effects implicated by just one
Justice's recusal.8 2 The resemblance of the 1972 statement to the con-
temporary statements issued by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist is not coincidental and it is quite clear that the duty-to-sit
rationale cited in 1972 remains equally as strong for the Court today.
The pragmatic concerns voiced by the Justices in these statements
and by the 1993 official recusal statement of the Supreme Court all
point to a fundamental flaw in the statutory recusal process as it ap-
plies to the High Court. Two commonly cited costs associated with the
recusal of one Justice are that the Court will be robbed of that Jus-
tice's legal input and decision-making power on what is likely a piv-
otal and national legal issue, and that the Court must proceed with
eight Justices which, as noted by the Chief Justice in Microsoft Corp.,
poses the risk that the Court will be locked in a four-to-four tie requir-
ing them to affirm the decision below.8 3 Because there is no court be-
yond the Supreme Court where a litigant can be heard, it is certainly
understandable that a Justice would resolve a close recusal question
in favor of sitting. It should not be surprising, then, that in spite of
the explicit Congressional intent to rid the federal judiciary of the
duty-to-sit concept, the Court of last resort has retained that "duty" in
order to shield litigants from a failure to adequately resolve their
issue.
B. Justice Scalia Failed to Apply the § 455(a) Recusal
Standard in Reaching His Final Decision
Justice Scalia indicated the legal question regarding his recusal
was "whether someone who thought I could decide this case impar-
tially despite my friendship with the Vice President would reasonably
believe that I cannot decide it impartially because I went hunting with
that friend and accepted an invitation to fly there with him on a Gov-
ernment plane."8 4 Although Justice Scalia's injection of the word
"reasonably" gives this statement a semblance of consistency with the
§ 455(a) objective standard, it is clearly out of alignment with a proper
application of that statute. Pursuant to § 455(a), the recusal issue
does not turn on whether a Justice "can" decide a case impartially;
rather this statutory standard requires a Justice to recuse himself if
his impartiality could "reasonably be questioned."8 5 Recall as well the
82. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 928-29.
85. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's own interpretation of § 455(a), which recognizes that
a judge should recuse himself to avoid "even the appearance of
partiality."8 6
The difference between the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 455(a) as requiring "the appearance of impartiality" on one hand,
and the standard used by Justice Scalia on the other, is illustrative of
a distinction drawn in the legal community regarding the appropriate
standard necessary to warrant a Justice's recusal:
The two principal competing standards of proof are the appearance-of-bias
test-the allegations need only be sufficient to support a reasonable appre-
hension of bias-and the bias-in-fact test-the allegations must be sufficient
to support a conclusion that bias actually exists. The obvious distinction be-
tween the two tests lies in the differing evidentiary burdens, with the bias-in-
fact test requiring the more substantial showing.
8 7
The objective standard written into § 455(a) by Congress in 1974
"suggests that the appearance of bias [test] is the appropriate stan-
dard of proof' to be applied to the statutory recusal question.8 8 The
applicability of this standard is substantiated by the statute's legisla-
tive history where it is clearly states that a judge should "disqualify
himself" if there exists "a reasonable factual basis for doubting the
judge's impartiality."8 9 In other words, the proponent of recusal is not
required to prove a Justice's actual bias in a case; rather she must
only prove that the facts demonstrate an appearance of that Justice's
impartiality. 90
The bias-in-fact test is relevant to gauging the necessity of recusal
under § 455(b)(1) which requires a judge's recusal if she "has a per-
sonal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." 9 1 Under this
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87. Randall J. Litteneker, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 242-43 (1978). Note that § 455 is not the only statutory
recusal provision. Another statute provides that a judge "shall proceed no fur-
ther" in an action where a party has filed an affidavit "that the judge before
whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000). It is equally as
important that "§ 144 applies only to district courts, [whereas] §455 is applicable
to any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States." WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 39, § 3542. Because a party is required to allege that a judge actually
has a bias in the underlying action, § 144 is widely held to be "most compatible
with the bias-in-fact standard." See Litteneker, supra, at 243.
88. See Litteneker, supra note 87, at 247.
89. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351.
90. The "appearance of impartiality" standard used by the Supreme Court is synony-
mous with appearance-of-bias test noted above, and thus it is a reasonable con-
clusion that the Court has adopted this appearance standard. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). One commentator points out that
"[tihe language of subsection (b)(1) is identical to the language of § 144 which...
has long been held to be governed by a bias-in-fact standard." Litteneker, supra
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subsection, a judge's recusal is not mandated by a question of reasona-
bleness regarding impartiality as in subsection (a); rather, a judge is
required to recuse herself because she actually has a manifest bias in
the case-at-hand.
9 2
The recusal standard used by Justice Scalia does not fit neatly
under either of these tests. The bias-in-fact test is clearly not at issue
in this matter because neither the Sierra Club nor Justice Scalia make
mention of it. Rather, in their motion for recusal, the Sierra Club un-
mistakably anchors its push for Justice Scalia's recusal in the appear-
ance-of-bias test. The Sierra Club specifically asserted that "it is the
appearance of partiality-and not actual bias-that is the test for
recusal under Section 455(a)".93 Interestingly, Justice Scalia makes
only three passing references to the § 455(a) standard en route to
reaching his non-recusal decision in response to the Sierra Club's mo-
tion. On two of these three occasions Justice Scalia makes no effort to
apply the standard; instead, he simply notes the general implication
made by the Sierra Club that his friendship or "appearance of friend-
ship" with the Vice President gives rise to the appearance of impropri-
ety.94 The third mention of the appearance standard occurs in the
context of a direct quote from the Sierra Club's recusal motion
wherein they argue that there is an "appearance of favoritism" impli-
cated by hunting trip.95 At no point does Justice Scalia make any ef-
fort to apply the appearance standard to the specific facts surrounding
the Court's grant of certiorari and the Louisiana hunting trip three
weeks later in an effort to gauge whether these facts may give rise to
an appearance of bias.
Rather than making his recusal decision under either of the availa-
ble recusal standards, Justice Scalia chose instead to focus on the fac-
tual and legal inaccuracies found throughout the Sierra Club's motion.
Challenging the veracity of the facts and law reported in the news
articles, Justice Scalia was able to shift attention to the absurdity of
the Sierra Club's contention that the mass media should serve as a
litmus test for what a reasonable person might think. Because the
recusal question must be decided from the "perspective of a reasonable
note 87, at 246-47. For a general comparison of § 455 and § 144, see WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 39, §§ 3542, 3551.
92. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, §3543.
93. Sierra Club Motion to Recuse, supra note 1, at 3. The Sierra Club references
§ 455(a) on several occasions throughout their brief, leaving no doubt regarding
their belief that Vice President Cheney's "vacation" with Justice Scalia amounts
to an appearance of bias. See id. at 1-3, 7-8.
94. Scalia Memorandum, supra note 3, at 928. The language quoted in the text
above is actually the second reference by Justice Scalia to the appearance stan-
dard. His first reference is made in the identical context as that cited above but
worded slightly differently: "appearance of my friendship." Id. at 920 (emphasis
added).
95. Id. at 923 (citation omitted).
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observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances,"96 and because America's newspapers were so blatantly
wrong in their reporting, Justice Scalia's rejection of the Sierra Club's
motion was both simple and convincing. However, Justice Scalia left
unresolved the ultimate recusal issue: whether a reasonable person
would perceive an appearance of partiality in the actual facts and law
(and not those reported in the newspapers). 9
7
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT A DISTINCT RECUSAL
POLICY FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES IN ORDER TO
ENSURE THE PUBLIC'S CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN THE
IMPARTIALITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE HIGHEST COURT
As one scholar has stated: "The people's trust in the fairness of
their judges is the foundation of our system of Justice. To earn this
trust, judges must inspire confidence in their impartiality. Judicial
authority and public order both ultimately flow from public respect
for, and confidence in, the impartiality of our judges."9 8 The recusal
problems highlighted in this Note are in no way intended to suggest
that the power of the federal judiciary, specifically that of the Su-
preme Court, is teetering upon collapse because of a loss of public con-
fidence in a Justice's impartiality. Although there may be some
occasional disagreement regarding the latest Supreme Court opinion,
the public typically values the Court's authority as the definitive and
final word on a given legal issue. With this fact in mind, many might
argue that the recusal procedure for the Supreme Court does not need
to be adjusted because of questionable application of § 455(a) at the
Supreme Court level. However, it is these very inconsistencies, when
accentuated by a highly polarizing recusal inquiry such as that sur-
rounding Justice Scalia in the Vice President's matter, which can be-
gin to chip away at the public's faith in Supreme Court hegemony.99
96. Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
97. Because the purpose of this Note is not to speculate on what Justice Scalia's
recusal decision should have been, there will be no further inquiry or discussion
on that topic here. For the purposes of this Note, it should suffice to conclude
that Justice Scalia's memorandum has framed a rather nebulous Supreme Court
recusal issue, thus implicating a need for clarification of the recusal standard for
the Supreme Court.
98. Pamela Willis Baschab, Putting the Cash Cow out to Pasture: A Call to Arms for
Campaign Finance Reform in the Alabama Judiciary, 30 CuMB. L. REV. 11, 12
(2000).
99. Virtually every newspaper in this country included some sort of commentary on
the appropriateness of Justice Scalia's recusal from this case. Sierra Club Motion
to Recuse, supra note 1, at 3-6. Although many of these articles carried some
factual and legal inaccuracies, they do point to a general public concern over the
recusal question in this case. Presumably, Justice Scalia's recusal decision was
in the spotlight of virtually all talk radio and television news programs as well. If
nothing else, the public media's concern with this recusal question indicates that
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Congress specifically cited its intention to enhance public confi-
dence in the federal judiciary when it adopted the objective revisions
to § 455.100 The Supreme Court's mis-application of the current stan-
dard to its recusal decisions exposes the Court to the development of a
loss of that public confidence. Thus, it would be prudent for Congress
to revisit the recusal issue in order to develop an alternative recusal
standard that provides for the unique concerns facing Justices on the
Supreme Court. One possibility would be to submit Justice recusal
decisions to a final vote of all nine of the Court members. Another
alternative would be to develop a recusal system similar to that of the
lower federal courts where a recused Justice is replaced by another
"Justice," thereby allowing the litigation to proceed with minimal in-
terruption. Each of these options has benefits and drawbacks merit-
ing a more in-depth discussion below. These solutions are not
intended to be conclusive. They are merely suggested starting points
for developing a Supreme Court recusal policy that achieves and
maintains the express legislative goals of maintaining public confi-
dence in the judiciary.
A. Permit All Nine Justices to Vote on the Recusal Question
Currently, a Justice's recusal decision is completely autonomous
and definitive. Even if there is some question regarding the appropri-
ateness of the Justice's decision, there is no statutory provision to be
invoked that would allow such an inquisition.O1 This inability to
challenge a recusal decision has led one commentator, while discuss-
ing § 455(a), to suggest that "[m]otions containing allegations of an
appearance of partiality should be decided by another judge. Because
this provision 'asks what a reasonable person knowing all the relevant
facts would think about the impartiality of the judge,' the challenged
judge is perhaps the last person who should rule on the motion."
10 2
Clearly there is some merit to the notion that a judge's ability to gauge
impartiality based on an objective standard is tempered by her per-
sonal involvement with whatever issue prompted the recusal question
in the first place. Without the safeguard of appeal for the litigant at
the Supreme Court level (unlike litigants in the lower federal courts),
a Justice's self-determination of a questionable recusal question may
result in diminished confidence in the Court's ultimate decision be-
the public, or at least those who either read the newspapers, listened to the radio
shows, or watched the news, formed some sort of opinion about Justice Scalia's
recusal.
100. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102. Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 559 (1994) (quoting Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
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cause of lingering doubts surrounding that Justice's impartiality.
However, if all nine Justices were involved in the recusal decision,
that confidence would be bolstered by the assurance that the recusal
decision was the result of discussion and deliberation by the entire
Court.
Procedurally, it would not be difficult to implement a policy for the
entire Court to review a Justice's recusal rationale. A Justice would
be required to memorialize the recusal issue inclusive of the relevant
facts, law, and personal impressions regarding the appropriateness of
recusal. The Justice would then submit these findings to the remain-
ing Justices who would then meet to discuss the recusal issue.
Presuming the parties in the underlying action adequately briefed the
recusal issue, their participation in this meeting should be excluded in
order to facilitate an expedient resolution to the matter. The Court
would then render a final vote on the appropriateness of recusal.' 0 3 If
a majority of the Court finds that a Justice's impartiality is reasonably
called into question pursuant to § 455(a), then that Justice is to abide
by that finding. Additionally, the Court's final vote should be re-
corded; however, the Court should retain discretion regarding the
need to issue a formal opinion on the recusal decision. 0 4
A simple application of this suggestion to the Justice Scalia and
Vice President matter illustrates how powerful such a policy could be.
Imagine, if instead of ruling on the Sierra Club's recusal motion and
then issuing a twenty-one page memorandum explaining the decision
(and subsequently unleashing the fury of American media), Justice
Scalia submitted the memorandum to the entire Court, where there
was discussion on the issue, and then a final vote favoring denial of
the motion. Although there may continue to be some public dissatis-
faction with this outcome, it would be difficult to call into question the
103. The Justice whose impartiality is being questioned would participate in the oral
discussions regarding recusal and the final vote on recusal. If the Justice were
excluded from participation, the inquiry would be devalued greatly because there
would be potential for a four-to-four tie vote, which is one of the risks prompting
the suggestion for reform in the first place. Furthermore, if a Justice were ex-
cluded from participating in the question of his own recusal, then the public may
call into question the legitimacy of the Court's findings because that Justice may
not have been adequately represented in the deliberations.
104. The Court's discretion here is important for two reasons. First, the recusal ques-
tion may or may not be an issue worthy of the time required for the Court to go
through the formalized process of opinion drafting. Because the Court would be
required to gauge every recusal motion, there will surely be some instances
where the answer is relatively clear from the Justice's memorandum, which
would require little, if any, discussion on the matter. Thus requiring an absolute
standard here may be unduly burdensome. Also important is that federal judges
and Justices are not currently required to record their recusal reasoning. This
expectation places much faith in the integrity of judicial decision-making and
should not be upset by an absolute standard requiring the Supreme Court to re-
cord its recusal reasoning.
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legitimacy of such a result because involvement of the entire Court
provided an additional safeguard against an erroneous ruling.
Beyond enhancing public confidence, the additional benefits of re-
quiring full Court participation in recusal decisions are that the Court
may be prompted both to abandon the duty-to-sit concept and to apply
the appearance-of-bias test in reaching its final decision. Although
this proposal may fail to fully alleviate the risk of reducing the Court
to eight voting members, the knowledge that a full Court recusal deci-
sion may be scrutinized by legal minds and by the public (through the
tinted lens of America's media, no doubt) may encourage the Court to
embrace the objective changes made to § 455(a) in 1974.
One drawback implicated by this proposal is the effect on the
Court's already busy schedule. Enacting a full Court recusal policy
would require the Court to spend additional time on the recusal ques-
tion when it is already under incredible time constraints. 0 5 It is not
clear how often a Justice's impartiality is called into question pursu-
ant to § 455(a) because a Justice is not required to publicly account for
his decision, and thus it is difficult to accurately estimate what sort of
impact a new policy would have on the Court. It should be sufficient
to suggest that there would necessarily be some adverse impact.
A second issue of concern is the possibility that a final vote regard-
ing recusal will be perceived as being more motivated by an alignment
of political ideology rather than by proper application of § 455(a). It is
not a shocking revelation that Justices are appointed to the Court
with their own political views, which are often reflected in their judi-
cial decisions.10 6 Some of the decisions reached by the Court are polit-
ically oriented with conservative Justices voting one way and liberal
Justices voting the other. For this reason, the Supreme Court "has
aggressively worked to protect the image of its decision-making as
above the fray of politics, personal interest, or internecine battles."'
0 7
It is imperative to be mindful of the Court "politics" when framing any
reform to the federal recusal standard. If, for example, the public per-
ception is that conservative Justices consistently vote together on the
105. The demands for the Supreme Court's time is evidenced by the fact that "[i]n a
typical year, over 7,000 petitions are filed with the Supreme Court for review of
lower court decisions. The Court denies review in the vast majority of cases, and,
in recent years, has issued full opinions in fewer than 100 cases each term." E.B.
Williams Library Research Guides, U.S. Supreme Court Research, http://www.ll.
georgetown.edu/lib/guides/supremecourt.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
106. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLIT-
iCs 32-33 (6th ed. 2003) (quoting W. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the
Supreme Court, Lecture at the University of Minnesota (Oct. 9, 1984)) ("There is
no reason in the world why a President should not 'pack' the Court-appoint peo-
ple to the Court who are sympathetic to his political and philosophical
principles.").
107. Ifill, supra note 46, at 614.
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recusal question in favor of advancing a conservative agenda-or lib-
eral Justices doing the same for a liberal agenda-then there would
inevitably be some stifling effect on the public's confidence in the
Court's decisions.
A final concern with a policy allowing the entire Court to deter-
mine the recusal question is that a Justice may not be entirely objec-
tive and forthcoming with all relevant information for the Court to
make a sound decision. If a Justice's partiality is called into question,
she is likely to have a strong opinion, one way or the other, on the
subject. It would, therefore, be nearly impossible to erase hints of sub-
jectivism in a Justice's recusal memorandum to the Court. For exam-
ple, certain facts may be construed as being vitally relevant while
others completely minimized or even excluded altogether. It is diffi-
cult to expect the Court to properly apply an objective recusal stan-
dard to information that has been spun in one direction or another.
Thus, a policy requiring the entire Court to vote on the appropriate-
ness of a Justice's recusal will require strong emphasis on eliminating
this personal subjectivity in order to get to the foundational objective
issues upon which the appropriate recusal decision must be made.
B. The Alternative Justice
A second possible amendment to Supreme Court recusal policy
available to Congress is to enact a temporary Justice provision, which
would permit a qualified substitute to "fill in" for a Justice opting for
recusal. Steven Lubet, Professor of Law at Northwestern University,
supports this very proposition in a well-developed article, suggesting
that either the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit or a
retired Supreme Court Justice be used as a temporarily fill-in.1o8
Professor Lubet finds justification for the "substitute-Justice" plan
in the policies of state and federal circuit courts, which utilize a tem-
porary substitution scheme. 109 Lubet suggests the Chief Judge of the
District of Columbia Circuit as a potential candidate; however, he
cites no reason why this judge would be the only good candidate for a
substitute Supreme Court Justice. 110 The physical proximity of that
108. See Lubet, supra note 46, at 673-75. In his article, Lubet does not suggest this
policy in the context of Justice recusal; rather, his discussion of the use of a sub-
stitute Justice is limited to certiorari decisions made by the Court.
109. Id. at 673-74. For a description of various state constitutional provisions enact-
ing a temporary judge scheme, see id. n.78. For a description of the federal cir-
cuit court of appeals temporary replacement policy, see id. at 674 n.79.
110. Id. at 673. Lubet does warn, however, that "[the use of a non-Supreme Court
judge would require legislative authorization and subsequent confirmation by the
Senate of any judge who might be enlisted." Id. n.77 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1 (giving Congress the power to "ordain and establish" inferior courts); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving power to appoint Supreme Court Justices to the
Senate as well as the President).
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judge to the Supreme Court (both located in Washington, D.C.), and
the presumed tenure and expertise of a Circuit Court Chief Judge are
likely the most compelling reasons. Except for the physical proximity
disadvantage of not being located in Washington, D.C., the Chief
Judge of any of the federal appellate circuit courts would be equally as
qualified for this role.
To avoid the constitutional hassles involved with using a non-Su-
preme Court Justice as a substitute,"1' Lubet suggests using a retired
Supreme Court Justice as the fill-in.l12 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 371,
a retired Justice is permitted to "retain the office" (maintain a salary),
if she continues with limited participation in Supreme Court activ-
ity.1 13 Because there is already a statutory provision for participation
of a retired Justice, Lubet notes that "there would appear to be no
statutory impediment to a Court rule (or practice) that calls upon re-
tired Justices to participate in certain votes."
114
Thus, in addition to formally enacting a substitute Justice policy,
the only additional requirement is that there must be living retired
Justices to play the alternate role. Lubet's article was printed in 1996
when Justices Lewis Powell, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and
Byron White were all living and officially retired from the Court.
None of these Justices, however, are alive today. Until the recent re-
tirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, no Justice had stepped
down since President Bill Clinton's appointment of Justice Stephen
Breyer in 1994 (replacing the retiring Justice Blackmun)."15
Regardless of whether a circuit court chief judge or a retired Su-
preme Court Justice is used as a substitute, there are clearly some
sticky issues requiring resolution for this plan to succeed. The major
problem with using a circuit judge lies in the often difficult and techni-
cal task of sifting through the constitutional requirements of such a
plan.116 The obvious flaw in a plan to use retired Justices is spot-
lighted by the fact that there is currently only one retired Justice.
Consequently, it may be imprudent to root recusal reformation in
111. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
112. Lubet, supra note 46, at 675.
113. Id. n.82 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) (2000)). In order to 'retain the office," a
retired Justice must be certified annually by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 371(e). The certification process requires the Chief Justice to
look at a variety of contributions by the retired Justice to the Court, including the
Justice's "caseload involving courtroom participation," and judicial duties not in-
volving courtroom participation. Id. If, in the Chief Justice's view, the retired
Justice's participation amounts to at least three months work, then the retired
Justice is said to be certified. Id.
114. Lubet, supra note 46, at 675 n.82.
115. OYEZ, U.S. Supreme Court Justices, http://www.oyez.orgloyez/portlet/justices/
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (providing a biography of every Justice to have served
on the Supreme Court inclusive of year of retirement and year of death).
116. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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something as unpredictable as the retirement and survival of its Jus-
tices. Even Lubet notes that if there were "no retired Justice [ I avail-
able or willing to substitute ... the Court would have to proceed...
with eight members."1 17
One implication not discussed by Lubet is the possibility that a
Justice considering recusal may weigh the political ideology of the al-
ternative Justice in her ultimate recusal decision. Consider, for exam-
ple, the present case involving Justice Scalia, a conservative Supreme
Court Justice. If he weighed recusal with the knowledge that a liberal
Justice would be his substitute, he may choose not to recuse himself in
lieu of the prospect of permitting the Court's vote to be reflective of a
more liberal framework. Given the outward attempt by the Court to
remove politics from its policies and procedures, one would hope that a
Justice would never permit her ultimate recusal decision to turn on
the substitute Justice's political ideology.
The drawbacks of this substitute Justice plan are clearly overshad-
owed by the promise such a plan has for maintaining the public's con-
fidence in the Court. The threat of the Court being reduced to eight
voting members is sufficiently mitigated by this plan because the re-
placement Justice would permit the Court to retain the benefits of a
nine-member vote, and thus avoid a four-to-four tie. This was one of
the primary reasons cited by members of the Court for resolving close
recusal questions in favor of sitting. A substitute Justice scheme
would permit the Court to finally abandon the duty-to-sit concept ex-
plicitly abolished by Congress in 1974. An additional benefit of this
plan is that it may prompt Justices to apply the appropriate appear-
ance of impartiality standard to their recusal decisions pursuant to
§ 455(a). Because there would be less concern about the effects of re-
ducing the Court to eight voting members, a Justice may devote more
attention to making a decision based on the appropriate standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's staunch defense of his decision to go duck hunting
with the Vice President only weeks after the United States Supreme
Court voted to grant a writ of certiorari to hear the discovery issue in
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia is a
well-developed response to the Sierra Club's motion for recusal. Pri-
marily concerned with the factual and legal inaccuracies relied on in
support of the motion, Justice Scalia delivered a one-two punch to the
motion, ultimately finding recusal to be inappropriate in this instance.
Although a well-drafted response to the Sierra Club's motion, Jus-
tice Scalia's memorandum falls short of addressing whether recusal
was appropriate in this case. Justice Scalia does place the recusal
117. Lubet, supra note 46, at 675.
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question within the scope of the § 455(a) objective standard as evi-
denced by the scattered and half-hearted references to a "reasonable
person" throughout his memorandum. Justice Scalia's failure to apply
the appearance of impropriety standard, declared by the Supreme
Court to be the appropriate standard, is indicative of a general disre-
gard for Congress' primary motivation for revising § 455(a) in 1974.
Further disregard for the intended function of the federal recusal
standard is found in Justice Scalia's reference to the duty-to-sit con-
cept, which has been referenced as well by other Justices and, more
broadly, in the Court's official recusal policy. Congress' intent in abol-
ishing the duty-to-sit concept by revising § 455(a) was explicit. Con-
tinued application of that policy by the Supreme Court not only
demonstrates disregard for the nation's law making body, but it also
sends the wrong message to the American public, upon whose confi-
dence the Judicial Branch's legitimacy depends.
It is not difficult to imagine a world where Justices are the butt of
jokes for comedians and late night talk show hosts, where the public is
polarized and numbed by an unrelenting media blitz on the most re-
cent Supreme Court holdings, and where a begrudging public ques-
tions and resists Supreme Court opinion on all fronts because of
perceived bias in those who reached the decision. Most would agree
that this is an accurate description of the current state of affairs in the
Executive and Legislative Branches.
Unlike the other branches of the federal government, the judiciary
is not directly accountable to voters. However, legal commentators,
members of the judiciary, and legislators alike have continually recog-
nized the importance of retaining, and even enhancing, the public's
confidence in the purity of the judicial system because the authority of
its decisions is derived from that confidence. The tremendous amount
of public attention and criticism Justice Scalia has received for his
recusal decision has been remarkably similar to the sort of public
frenzy one would expect with the latest presidential policy or congres-
sional squabbling. The danger in this sort of attention to the Court is
self-evident.
If Justice Scalia's decision was consistent with the statutory
recusal standard and representative of the intended function of that
provision, then the public's concern over his decision might have been
quelled by the accurate application of the law to the facts at issue.
However, because Justice Scalia clearly failed to apply the law in this
situation, the public's disdain for his refusal to recuse himself is well
founded and should send a signal to this nation's lawmakers regard-
ing a need to address the Supreme Court recusal issue.
Christopher Riffle
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